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Equality and the Law of 
Custody and Access 
The Canadian Charter f l igh ts  and Freedomsl has had a significant impact on 
the direction of family law reform in this country. "Illegitimacy" has been 
rejected as a relevant legal ~oncep t .~  Same-sex couples are free to enter into civil 
marriages in Ontario, British Columbia and Q ~ e b e c . ~  The Law Reform 
Commission ofCanada recently recommended that the distribution ofbenefits 
recognize non-conjugal relationships. In both our judicial and legislative 
responses to changing families and our jurisprudence in the area of substantive 
equality, Canada has been applauded as a world leader. 
Despite Canada's international achievements, in day to day work in the 
trenches of family law, practitioners often wonder whether Charter principles 
are really very meaningful in family law cases. Direct challenges questioning the 
constitutionality of legislation gain national and international legal attention. 
But what of the simple requirement that we view all of our cases "through the 
lens" of equality juri~prudence?~ Does the principle of equal benefit of the law 
have any meaning for a mother with a disability on social assistance who is 
fighting for custody of her children? While the Charter applies to government 
action and does not directly affect purely private litigation, judges' decisions are 
always to be guided by Charter  principle^.^ Are the tenets of family law 
developing in accordance with our notions of substantive equality? 
This paper is a brief survey of the impact of equality principles in custody 
and access cases. If "justice is blind,"6 should the skin colour ofa mother matter? 
Do mothers with disabilities face discrimination in claiming custody of their 
children? Fathers' rights groups claim bias in favour ofwomen and lobby for a 
presumption of shared parenting, arguing that differential outcomes in custody 
litigation are a sign of discriminatory thinking by judges. How should gender 
influence the best interests of the child test? 
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This discussion is divided by issues of sexual orientation, gender, disability, 
class, race. Life, of course, is more complicated. This segmented approach is 
necessarily an artificial one which threatens to conceal that categories of 
privilege and oppression are experienced simultaneously, as interrelated and 
overlapping. A South Asian middle-class able-bodied lesbian, for example, will 
experience sexism, racism and sexual orientation discrimination, as well as her 
class and able-bodied privilege, in a complex and integrated manner. As many 
academics have discussed, the ways in which forms of oppression interact in the 
life of any individual is not additive in nature-a woman of colour will not 
experience the same sex discrimination as a white woman plus the racism 
experienced by a man of colour. At the same time as there is danger in 
oversimplifying the experiences of oppression and privilege, it is necessary to 
make more basic generalizations in order to identify and target discrimination. 
This paper is by no means a comprehensive review of caselaw attempting 
to document systemic discrimination in Canadian courts. Rather, it is written 
from an anti-oppression framework which recognizes that sexism, racism, 
ableism, classism, homophobia and heterosexism are systemic problems in 
Canadian society which shape legal discourse. I t  is to be expected that our 
constitutional ideals of equality will not always inspire family law decision- 
making, but this is a failure of justice. 
Charter principles of equality should inform custody and access decisions. 
This is not an abstract requirement but an imperative absolutely crucial to 
protect and advance the best interests ofthe child. While the best interests test 
is "the onlytestn in child-related matters: best interests cannot be divorced from 
the spirit and values of the Charter. 
We must constantlywork at developing family law in line with substantive 
equality principles. This means decision-making without recourse to "common 
sense" stereotypes or discriminatory ideas. It means considering the full social, 
political, and historical context ofthe case,with an eye to the realities ofhistoric 
discrimination and disadvantage. Substantive equality requires that we attune 
ourselves to the perspectives of those traditionally silenced in legal discourse. 
Family law will only serve all families well when we take the time to be guided 
by the principles of substantive equality. 
Substantive equality 
Andrewsv. Law Society ofBritish Columbia8 was the first case decided by the 
Supreme Court of Canada under the equality guarantee of the Charter. The 
court adopted a notion of equality that is not strictly individualistic, but instead 
requires consideration of the broader social and political context to ascertain 
group disadvantage. Discrimination means more than differential treatment 
between similarly situated groups. A substantive approach to equality seeks to 
remedy historical disadvantage. The central concern is to ensure that the law 
respects the human dignity of all persons. 
An equality rights claimant has the onus to show that the impugned 
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provision is discriminatory. Discrimination was defined by Justice Iacobucci for 
a unanimous Court in Law, as follows: 
First, does the impugned law (a) draw a formal distinction between 
the claimant and others on the basis of one or more personal 
characteristics, or (b) fail to take into account the claimant's already 
disadvantaged position within Canadian society resulting in 
substantively differential treatment between the claimant and others 
on the basis of one or more personal characteristics? If so, there is 
differential treatment for the purpose of S. 15(1). Second, was the 
claimant subject to differential treatment on the basis of one or more 
of the enumerated and analogous grounds? And third, does the 
differential treatment discriminate in a substantive sense, bringing 
into play the purpose of S. 15(1) of the Charter in remedying such ills 
as prejudice, stereotyping and historical di~advantage?~ 
The question ofwhether discrimination has occurred in a substantive sense 
must be viewed from the perspective of the person claiming a Charterviolation. 
The central focus is the eflect of the impugned provision on the disadvantaged 
group. This can be seen only by examining the larger social, political, legal and 
economic context and looking at the impact of the law on the lives of the 
individuals it touches.lOThis effects-based approach has allowed the Supreme 
Court to recognize that discrimination exists where society has been structured 
on the assumption that everyone shares the characteristic of a dominant group 
and where facially neutral legislation has an adverse effect on a historically 
disadvantaged group. 
Charter principles and the "best interests of the child" test 
In Young v. Young,ll the Supreme Court of Canada described the best 
interests standard as consonant with Charter values, stating that "it aims to 
protect avulnerable segment of society by ensuring that the interests and needs 
of the child take precedence over any competing considerations in custody and 
access decisions."12 Again in P. (D.) v. S. (C.)13 the Supreme Court held that the 
best interest test is consistent with the underlying values of the Charter. While 
valid custody and access orders made under the best interests test are immune 
from review under the Charter,14 the best interests of the child test should be 
applied in a manner which is sensitive to Charter principles. 
As McLachlin J. wrote in Young v. Young. 
I t  has been left to the judge to decide what is in the "best interests of 
the child," by reference to the "condition, means, needs and other 
circumstances" of the child. Nevertheless, the judicial task is not one 
of pure discretion. By embodying the "best interests" test in legislation 
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and by setting out general factors to be considered, Parliament has 
established a legal test, albeit a flexible one. Like all legal tests, it is to 
be applied according to the evidence in the case, viewed objectively. There 
is no room for the judgeipersonalpredilections andprejudices. The judge's 
duty is t o  apply the law. He or she must do not what he or she wants to do 
but what he or she ought t o  do. [emphasis added]15 
The application of the best interests test in light of substantive equality 
principles has two facets: judges and counsel must be attuned to the fact that 
discriminatory thinking is pervasive and will affect their own "common sense" 
and second, there must be a recognition ofthe importance and value ofpolitical 
identities associated with discrimination. A true understanding of the condi- 
tion, needs, means and circumstances of the child requires full comprehension 
of the larger social and political context of the custody litigation. 
A substantive equality approach to custody and access decision-making 
also requires that adults challenge ourselves to respect the autonomy, psycho- 
logical integrity and dignity of children, without discrimination based on age. 
Children's equality interests have received limited attention in the develop- 
ment of equality jurisprudence. Indeed, the Supreme Court still considers it 
legitimate that children lack equal protection from assault.16 Still, this is likely 
to be an emerging area in the development of substantive equality in family law 
requiring, for example, increased voice to children's wishes. 
Gay and lesbian custody issues 
In one of our recent cases, a judge stated in open court that he had no 
problem with our client's parenting: it was her "lifestyle" that he had a problem 
with. Interim custody was awarded to the father, not our client--a devoted 
stay-at-home mother who had come out as a lesbian. This type of clearly 
discriminatoryjudicial reasoning is abhorrent and has no place in our system of 
justice. However, it still occurs with alarming frequency. 
An equality-minded approach was adopted in the Ontario case of Re K.' 
In that 1995 same-sex adoption decision, Judge Nevins expertly summarizes an 
array of social science evidence and provides answers to common homophobic 
stereotypes about gay and lesbian parenting. There is now a wealth of 
sociological and psychological evidence demonstrating that same-sex parenting 
has no adverse impact on, and may in fact be a benefit to, children.18 Two 
American sociologists, Professors Judith Stacey and Timothy J. Biblam, 
recently released a comprehensive review of the studies, "(How) Does the 
Sexual Orientation ofparents Matter?"191t is an extremely useful and accessible 
piece of academic literature. The authors find suggestive superior benefits of 
lesbian parenting and no detrimental differences between same-sex and het- 
erosexual parenting. The "no-harm" conclusion is unsurprising, since there is 
no credible theory that would reasonably lead scholars to predict harms to 
children parented by self-identified lesbians or gay men. 
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M e r  decades of research, there is every reason to believe that children 
parented by same-sex couples are at least as well parented, and their develop- 
ment is at least as successful, as children with heterosexual parents. This is the 
case even though same-sex parents currently confront disadvantages deriving 
from the non-legal status of their relationship, the frequent invisibility of the 
second parent's relationship and the social stigma with which both they and 
their children must contend. Stacey and Biblarz therefore conclude that there 
must be compensatory processes in gay and lesbian parenting that enable those 
children to develop as well as they consistently have been shown to develop. 
In the past, most cases with issues of sexual orientation involved a straight 
parent against a gay or lesbian parent who had come out after the birth of the 
chidren. Now, we increasingly see disputes between (usually) lesbian parents 
whose children were born into the relationship itself. In these cases, judges 
seem all too eager to be "equality-minded" by awarding equal time and joint 
custody regardless of the facts of the case. 
On a recent first attendance, for example, the judge insisted that temporary 
joint custody and shared time ought to be awarded after the breakdown of the 
lesbian relationship. There was no evidence from either parent before the court, 
since the former partner had just launched her application. The judge openly 
challenged us to appeal, not caring that the birth mother had been denied an 
opportunity to make her case, because he was so entrancedwith the idea of two 
equal mothers. Whiie his decision was reversed, it is trite law that substantive 
equality does not require identical treatment. We  must instead consider the 
lived circumstances ofthe parties, the larger social and political context, and the 
effect of the decision on the lives of the chidren. In this case, when she had an 
opportunity to give evidence, the birth mother stated that, while she had a 
spousal relationship with her partner, they had not parented together. The 
pregnancywas her own decision, and all care giving had been performed by her 
alone. 
When I discuss this case with American attorneys, they are typically 
shocked and horrified that I take the position that the birth mother's account 
might be accurate, and if so, that joint custody and equal time would be 
inappropriate. In jurisdictions where non-biological mothers are denied any 
legal recognition, like most American states, their emphasis is understand- 
ably, and rightly, on recognizing and respecting non-biological parenting. 
There is no question that in many cases parenting is shared almost equally, 
and joint custody is a good option if the parties are able to communicate. Still, 
justice requires individual determination. I t  is entirely possible that a birth 
mother with a male or female spouse could parent almost single-handedly, 
and her special history of care giving should, in my view, be recognized post- 
separation. In particular, with very young children, 1 have no hesitation in 
arguing that we must appreciate a birth mother's period of pregnancy and 
breast-feeding as creating a history of attachment, whether in the lesbian or 
heterosexual context. 
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Trans parents 
Having a non-heterosexual sexual identity was regarded as a mental 
disorder until 1973. Today, a gay or lesbian identity is regarded as non- 
pathological. Transsexual/ transgendered people,20 in contrast, are classed as 
mentally disordered under the diagnostic manual of the American Psychiatric 
Association, the DSM IV. Gender identity disorder (GID or GIDC in 
children) was introduced as a diagnosis in the 1980 edition ofthe DSM (DSM- 
IIIR). Since the 1994 DSM-IV, the criteria for the diagnosis have expanded. 
Adults who seek sex reassignment surgery and/or hormonal treatments 
rely on this classification in order to obtain insurance coverage for their 
treatments. At the same time, trans people rightly object to the characterization 
of their personal identity as pathology: a GID diagnosis stigmatizes trans 
people, fostering discrimination in all aspects of life. Particularly disturbing is 
the diagnosis of GIDC to "treat" children who do not conform to stereotype 
ie. girls who enjoy playing with trucks rather than dolls are classed as psychi- 
atrically disordered. Treatment protocols for children diagnosed with GIDC 
include coercive therapy, behavior modification, forced institutionalization, 
and drugs. 
In Forresterv. Salibaj21 our client was a lesbian male-to-female transsexual 
father.22 The mother alleged that the gender transition of the father constituted 
a material change in circumstances such that the parties' shared parenting 
arrangement was no longer in the child's best interests. She also argued that a 
change of custody was warranted as a result of the father's depression and 
gender dysphoria at the time ofthe transition. The mother also unilaterally took 
the child for "testing" for GID and was permitted to continue doing so by 
interim order, despite our client's objection. Our client was worried the testing 
would create an issue aroundgenderwhere there had been none. In the end, the 
"experts" pronounced that the little girl was suitably feminine. 
At trial, Judge Wolder held that the father's gender transition was 
irrelevant to a determination of the child's best interests. He also recognized 
that the father's period of depression, now in remission, could not constitute a 
material change, justifying a new order. In this manner, the court rejected the 
traditional stigma of mental illness and confirmed that transsexuality is not a 
negative factor in custody determination. Rather than branding the father as 
flawed because of a period of depression, the court understood depression as an 
illness from which a person may experience successful recovery. 
Custody and the parent with a disability 
Dominant social discourses label persons with disabilities as deviant, 
dangerous and incompetent. Ableism - the idea that persons with disabilities 
are less worthy than able-bodied people - is deeply entrenched and reinforced 
by the social, medical and legal discourses of our culture. When a judge 
considers the best interests of a child, how do mothers with physical or mental 
disabilities fare? 
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Given the larger social context of ableism, it is no surprise that mothers 
with disabilities experience discrimination in maintaining and fostering rela- 
tionships with their children. Our country has a shameful history of forcibly 
sterilizing people with di~abilities.~~ Today, people with disabilities face 
discriminatory scrutiny by child protection agencies, prejudice in custody and 
access decision-making and a denial of access to justice due to systemic barriers. 
Our office recently acted for a mother who is deaf in a child protection case. 
The mother had contacted the Children's Aid Society during her pregnancy on 
the mistaken assumption that the Society would provide her with some 
assistance in obtaining a crib and other necessities in anticipation of her child's 
birth. The Society opened an investigation and assessed her as an "intermediate 
risk" solely on the basis that she is deaf. The Children's Aid Society then took 
the child into custody on the basis that she was allegedly ignoring the child's 
crying. Although the motherwas breast-feeding, the child was removed by the 
Society, without any sign-language interpretation, seriously damaging early 
bonding and establishment of the breast-feeding relationship. 
Parents suffering from "psychiatric illness" are regarded as particularly 
suspect by courts. But there are progressive, equality-minded decisions, in- 
spired by section 15 of the Charter. Once a mental illness is in remission or is 
otherwise under control, it should not affect a custody determination since it 
does not impact on the child. 
In the case of Henley v. Jarnie~on,2~the father was applying for sole custody 
on the basis that the mother's depression made her being unable to provide 
consistent positive parenting for their daughter. In granting the mother's 
request for joint custody, Dunn J. held: 
Individuals with mental disabilities are to be afforded equal protection 
and equal benefit of the law.. . . 
Onlywhen it is shown, on a factual basis, that some harm might come 
to the child as a result of symptoms or manifestations of the mental 
disability, can restrictions arise in terms ofparental custodial rights.. . . 
There is no cogent evidence before me that would lead me to believe 
that there is any likelihood the respondent will have a sudden and 
immediate relapse or that such a relapse might cause [the child] 
harm.. . . 
Similarly, in D.M. v. L.M.,25 the father attempted to vary the conditions 
of a consent order granting the mother custody. The father was seeking sole 
custodywhile the motherwas prepared to acceptjoint custody. The mother had 
on many occasions conducted herself in very irrational manner as a result of a 
mental illness. Expert evidence established that her mental health had im- 
proved and the condition was under control. Her doctor gave evidence that, 
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although there was no c u e  for the condition, it could be controlled by 
medication. The Court ordered joint custody and stated: 
Had the mother continued in her previous conduct there would be no 
question about the applicant's claim for custody, as she would not have 
been in a position to have assumed a role as a custodial or joint 
custodial parent in a significant way without serious implications for 
the child. If, in the future, her medical condition deteriorates and she 
is unable to continue to control her conduct, then that would be a 
material change in circumstances that would warrant a review by this 
court of the custody and access arrangements. Under her current 
regime of medical treatment, I find that she is an acceptable joint 
custodial parent.26 
In MacArthur v. MacArth~r,~' the parents of two children had an agree- 
ment by which the mother had day to day care and control, and the father liberal 
access. The father then sought sole custody. He alleged that the mother, 
although generally a good parent, suffered from depression, had assaulted the 
father twice, and had attempted or threatened suicide three times over the past 
two years. Experts testified that she did not pose a risk to her children. In 
ordering joint custody, Martin J. stated that the "Court is in no better position 
than the psychiatrists who have been caring for the mother and are familiar with 
her condition." In light of the experts' opinions, there was no reason to award 
custody to the father. 
As noted, most of these cases revolve around the assessment of a parent by 
mental health experts. While expert opinion is accorded significant respect in 
dominant legal discourse, the categorization and definition of "disability" is 
highly political. The notion of disability itself is a contested concept. Women 
are labeled with higher rates of depression and other forms of mental illness. In 
the U.S., nearly twice as many women as men are diagnosed with a depressive 
disorder each year.28 This must be understood as part of the long history of 
characterizing women as hysterical, emotionally unstable, mentally ill.29 I t  is 
- 
also important to recognize cultural causes of depression: for example, women 
have the stress of multiple work and family responsibilities and greater 
frequency of sexual and physical abuse, sexual discrimination, and poverty. The 
accusation that a mother is depressed or otherwise "crazy" is frequently made 
in custody and access litigation. Mental illness is particularly stigmatized in our 
culture and the labeling, pathologization and "syndromization" of women is 
consistent with dominant sexist discourses. 
One example is "parental alienation." Another variation of mother- 
blaming, women are routinely criticized when children are resistant to access. 
Dr. Janet Johnston and many other noted researchers remind us that conflicted 
access cases should be evaluated from the child's perspective. The child's age, 
cognitive capacities and the ongoing experience of the conflict contribute 
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significantly to the problem. The answer is not wild, blaming litigation or 
demands for custody changes; in fact, litigation is ill-advised in cases of real 
conflict around access, since the court process is unable to "assert control" over 
a child or "solve" this problem. As with all cases involving legitimate concerns 
about a child's mental and social development, a therapeutic approach is best. 
Men's claims to formal equality in custody decision-making 
The frequent allegations of "parental alienation" are closely related to the 
rise of the fathers' rights movement. A vocal minority of divorced fathers has 
been setting the agenda offamilylawreform since 1997 when, in order to secure 
passage of the Guidelines, the federal government agreed to strike the Special 
Joint Senate-Commons Committee on Custody and Access.30 Since the 
Committee repodl advocating a presumption of shared parenting, men have 
experienced success in claiming that they are not treated equally in custody 
decision-making. They increasingly rely on the "friendly parent rulen to attack 
women who claim sole custody. 
Fathers' rights activists argue that "...the fact that men receive sole custody 
of their children far less often than women, even against the backdrop of a 
gender-neutral legal standard, suggests 'judicial bias'."32 In order to rectify what 
they perceive to be a bias in the system, they argue that formal equality demands 
a joint custody presumption in child custody law. In support of their claims to 
joint custody, fathers also argue that mothers and fathers each bring unique, 
complementary qualities to parenting; any mother who fails to accept this is an 
access-withholding evildoer. 
Although the government has not formally amended the Divorce Act, it 
seems that judges frequently rule as though there is a shared parenting 
presumption in custody cases. There is an Ontario Court of Appeal decision 
that joint custody is an exceptional order that should only be imposed where 
both parents agree to shared p ~ e n t i n g . ~ ~  It has been overruled in practice. 
Women, still charged with primaryresponsibility for the work ofparenting, are 
expected to do whatever it takes to accommodate men's access to their children. 
Courts will now order joint custody even where there is adamant 0pposition,3~ 
and many separated women now find themselves held hostage in the jurisdic- 
tion, unable to move because of the father's "right to access."35 
The claim for equal treatment of fathers and mothers in custody cases relies 
on a misguided formal equality argument, an approach rightly rejected in our 
Charterjurisprudence. Substantive equality requires an examination of the full 
social and political context of the claim and focuses on the impact of a law in 
the lives ofthe affected individuals. Looking at the current context ofparenting 
disputes through the lens of substantive equality, a presumption of shared 
parenting is revealed as both inappropriate and dangerous. 
"[Glender neutral" analysis ignores or obscures the inequalities and 
power relations that exist between men and women. The current 
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"gender neutral" analysis, which treats unequals as ifthey were equals, 
does not lead to equality and "justice" but more deeply entrenches 
inequality and power  imbalance^.^^ 
The reality of the current social context is that women are generally 
primarily responsible for the care of children. Still, men succeed in almost half 
of the contested custody cases.37 Any differential legal outcomes in favour of 
women are not a tell-tale sign that men are discriminated against in custody 
disputes, but rather are a natural consequence of the lived realities of a gender 
division in care giving.38 Continuity of care is important to children. 
A father frequently develops a sudden interest in the child's life or indicates 
a desire to become more involved afier separation. Promises offuture behaviour 
are not the same as a history of daily care giving. Time at hockey practice is not 
the same as organizing your daily life and all of your choices around the 
children. O n  the other hand, once a gendered pattern of care giving is no longer 
possible as a result of separation, a parent may sincerely be interested in 
changing his priorities. It  may be difficult to determine the sincerity of such 
wishes, however, in light of child support legislation. 
In all too many cases, the onset of a father's new interest in the children is 
inspired by his seeking to reach the 40 percent threshold of time that permits 
deviation from the child support tables. This provision of the Federal Child 
Support Guidelines has very negatively impacted custody and access litigation. 
Any connection between financial issues and access must be reconsidered. One 
method of evaluating claims for joint custody or equal time in negotiation- 
albeit an obvious and not always reliable one-is to ask the father directly if he 
would be willing to pay the table amount of child support even if he was awarded 
equal time. 
Some men are interested in shared parenting because they want control of 
decision-making. Unfortunately, as many academics have noted, custody 
litigation is often a means to continue contact and control of the former spouse 
and children, rather than building a relationship with the children.39 
The trend toward a presumption of shared parenting is often furthered by 
reference to the "friendly parent rule." Section 16 (10) of the Divorce Act 
provides: 
In making an order under this section, the court shall give effect to the 
principle that the child of the marriage should have as much contact 
with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child 
and, for that purpose, shall take into consideration the willingness of 
the person for whom custody is sought to facilitate such conduct. 
This section has been transformed into a ''maximum contact principle," 
losing sight of the plain language of the provision and the ultimate standard of 
the best interests of the child. For example, in Hildinger v. C ~ r r o l l , ~ ~  a father 
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residing in New York City who had never lived with his one year old child was 
awarded joint custody and generous access, including visits of up to one week 
at a time. Although his case was decided under the Children's Law Reform Act, 
and therefore the court did not specifically aver to the maximum contact-or 
"friendly parent"-provision of the Divorce Act, the court mentioned several 
times that the child would "profit from growing up knowing both her 
parents."41 
In Hess v. Hess, the mother was criticized for not encouraging (as opposed 
to facilitating), the father-child relati~nship:~~ "There is a significant difference 
between facilitating such a relationship and actually encouraging it ... I remain 
concerned about the ability of the wife to encourage actively the kind of 
relationship the children deserve to have ...." (Notwithstanding that s.16 (10) 
of the DivorceAct explicitly uses the word "facilitate" and Epstein J. found that 
there was no doubt that Mrs. Hess did "facilitate" the relationship.) 
The reality and seriousness of male abuse of women is another issue 
frequently disregarded by the courts.43 Part of the reality of our current social 
context is that the abuse of women by male partners is widespread. A shared 
parenting presumption invites continued control of women by abusive men. 
Continuing conflict and perpetuation ofabuse is not in children's best interests. 
A shared parenting presumption would enhance the use of litigation as an 
extension of the abuse. 
Already, as a result of the new focus on joint custody, abused women 
"choose" not to leave their relationships for fear oflosing their children or being 
locked into continuing struggles with the children's father. There are increasing 
numbers of women deciding to stay in abusive situations "for the sake of the 
children." As Justice L'Heureux-Dube has written, "to deny the existence ofthe 
equality component in family law is to trivialize the very inequalities suffered 
largely by women and children."44 
Section 16(9) of the Divorce Act is also used to condone male violence 
against women. Section 16(9) of the Act prevents a court from considering any 
past conduct unless it is relevant to the ability of that person to act as a parent 
of a child. It provides: 
In making an order under this section, the court shall not take into 
consideration the past conduct of any person unless the conduct is 
relevant to the ability of that person to act as a parent of the child. 
Judges need to recognize that violence against a spouse is relevant to 
parenting ability, rather than dismiss abusive past conduct as irrelevant. The 
"friendly parent rule" exacerbates the dangers of failing to recognize the 
seriousness of abuse. It is not reasonable to require a custodial parent to 
facilitate contact regardless ofpast violence. While they are facially-neutral, ss. 
16(9) and (10) have serious consequences for women and children. 
In Sheny v. Shery, the father was awarded unsupervised access despite the 
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mother's claims that he physically abused both her and the children.45 The 
father deposed that he did punish the children by spanking them but never 
"struck the children with intent to injure them." Two assessors conducting 
assessments on two separate occasions recommended supervised access. The 
trial judge, purporting to follow the majority judgment of the Supreme Court 
in Youngv. Young, framed the issue as a balancing exercise between riskofharm 
to the child versus the benefits of a free and open relationship with the access 
parent "as he or she is." He  placed the onus on the custodial parent to prove not 
only that there is a risk of harm to the children, but that the riskwas substantial. 
In Beck v. BalsilZie, a father with a history ofviolence and alcohol abuse was 
awarded unsupervised access against the wishes ofthe m ~ t h e r . ~ ~ T h e  fath r had 
six criminal convictions, five ofwhich were for assault. Despite evidence of the 
assault convictions, the trial judge claimed that he had to decide the case solely 
on untested affidavit evidence. The conditions of the unsupervised access were 
that the father abstain from alcohol during the visits and that his new wife be 
in town, although not necessarily present, at the time. 
Barriers of class and custody 
Although child abuse is equally prevalent across lines of race and class, poor 
families and non-white families are more likely to be subject to the scrutiny of 
child protection agen~ies.~' This is a result of prejudice and stereotype, and the 
greater availability for inspection and supervision of those who are poor. Only 
the wealthy can afford privacy. 
In custody and access cases, too, class has a serious influence on the results. 
If a mother is employed in a professional career or is self-employed, she is 
portrayed as a "bad mother" who has abandoned her mothering responsibilities; 
she is likely to be characterized as obsessed with her work and as deficient in her 
parenting. A father is not subject to similar negative judgments if he is 
dedicated to his career. 
The bias against working mothers is illustrated by Roebuck v. Roebu~k.~' 
The father was a farmer, and his mother, who lived with him, was available to 
help with housekeeping and babysitting. The mother, by contrast, was em- 
ployed. If she had been awarded custody, the child would have to have been 
placed in daycare. The father won custody. 
At  the same time, if a mother is notworking in paid employment or is poor, 
she may be deemed unable to provide financially for the children. Very few 
women obtain support awards and many of those support orders are unpaid. In 
the year following separation, only 35 per cent ofwomen with children receive 
support (child and spousal) As Julien Payne suggests, the issue of 
economic support post-separation requires a more systemic approach. Priva- 
tized obligations will never address the endemic poverty of women and 
children. More comprehensive socio-political changes are required.50 
Economic inequality also jeopardizes claims to custody and access of 
children because lower income persons simply cannot afford to litigate. In New 
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Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G.(J.) BG.], the 
Supreme Court of Canada held that a mother's section 7 rights were infringed 
by the denial oflegal aid services for a child protection hearing. The Court held 
that section 7 does not provide "... an absolute right to state-funded counsel at 
all hearings where an individual's life, liberty and security is at stake, and the 
individual cannot afford a la~yer." '~The considerations are: the seriousness of 
the issues at stake, the complexity of the proceedings and the capacities of the 
litigant.53 Funded counsel must be ordered when a fair hearing would not take 
place otherwise. The majority judgment of Lamer J. considered such cases to 
be unusual.s4 The concurring judgment of L'Heureux-Dube J. recognized that 
such situations would not necessarily be rare.55 Relying on JG., as well as 
principles of equality and best interests of the child, it is possible to assert a 
constitutional claim to state paid counsel in family law disputes more broadly.56 
Economics also impacts on custody determinations because men re- 
partner more quickly than women post-divorce. Men are more likely to be able 
to afford to support the new partner as a stay-at-home parent. 
[A] second wife or paternal grandmother may be held superior as a 
primary caregiver to mothers who have to, or choose to, workin order 
to support their children, or disadvantaged women in low paying jobs, 
who are on social assistance .... Thus, if the mother is poor, she may 
be deemed unable to provide financially if she is employed in a 
professional career, she may be deemed to have abandoned her 
mothering resp~nsibilities.~~ 
The Supreme Court of Canada has recently commented on this issue in 
Van de perre-v. Ed~a rds .~ '  Although known moie for its determination of the 
impact of race in custody disputes and the scope of appellate review, the class 
implications of the decision are also important. 
In Van de Perre, the trial judge granted custody to the mother, who had 
been the child's primary caregiver since his birth. The appeal court reversed, not 
only on an appreciation of the importance of race, but seemingly influenced by 
classist ideology. 
The fatherwas a black professional basketball playerwho was married with 
two children. Due to his wealth, his wife was available to stay home to look after 
the children full-time. She was characterized as a strong blackwomanwho held 
her family together, despite her husband's infidelities. 
In contrast, the mother was described as follows in Mr. Edwards' factum: 
From 1996 to trial in 1998, the Appellant continued to have multiple 
sexual partners, pursue basketball players, other professional athletes 
and celebrities, frequent clubs and go on trips leaving Elijah with 
multiple caregivers. She has little education or interest in obtaining 
more, a very poor work record, and a history of taking, not giving to 
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the community and others. Her promiscuity, partying, pursuit of 
athletes and interest in a "profit pregnancy". . . are not dealt with by the 
trial judge ....59 
Essentially, the Court of Appeal adopted this view - the mother being 
portrayed as an unmarried, uneducated, unemployed woman motivated by 
dreams of a huge child support award-as sexually promiscuous so-called 
"white trash." 
The Court ofAppeal invited the father's wife to apply for joint custody and 
reversed the trial decision. Custodywas awarded to the father and his wife, who 
had not been a party at the trial level. The appellate court held that the trial 
judge failed to consider all relevant factors in considering the best interests of 
the child. In particular, "he set aside the obvious superiority of the E.'s family 
situation ...."60 The Court held that the trial judge's decision should have taken 
account the presence of the father's wife, rather than comparing the father 
against the mother. 
The Court of Appeal reasoned that the father and his wife could provide 
Elijah with a more stable environment than could Ms. Van de Perre alone: 
"Although both parents demonstrate above adequate parenting capacities, it is 
my opinion that the E.'s are more able to provide for [the child's] best 
intere~t."~lThe Court of Appeal complained that the trial judge ignored "the 
fact that [MS K.V.] does not have her grade 12 education ...." 
Overruling the Court of Appeal decision, the Supreme Court of Canada 
restored the trialjudge's decision to grant custody to the mother. The Supreme 
Court held that a parent's support network was relevant but "the objective in 
every case is to determine the parenting abilities of the specific person who will 
ultimately receive c~stody."~~The addition of the father's wife as a party on the 
appeal court's own motion was an error. For a unanimous court, Justice 
Bastarache wrote: 
A trial judge cannot give custody to a father merely because his wife 
is a good mother. Her presence is a factor but, overall, the court must 
consider if the applicant would make a good father in her absence. 
Even if the family were stable, this would not be determinative ... 
Here, it is Mr. Edwards' personal capacity to exercise custody that 
must be considered, and the support provided by his wife is but a factor 
to be weighed in assessing these parental abilities.63 
The Supreme Court's decision on this point aligns with substantive 
equality principles. Hopefully, this reasoning will be helpful in protecting the 
interests of lower income working mothers. 
Classism should not influence custody and access determinations. The 
reality is, however, that as long as poor and low income Canadians are denied 
access to legal representation, there will be no substantive equality in family law. 
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Race and custody 
Prior to the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Edwards v. Van de 
P e ~ e , ~ ~  there were few cases on the impact of race in determining the best 
interests of the child. Some decisions emphasized the risk of harm to children 
of colour if raised outside their own race and culture. Others minimized the 
impact of race on children's welfare. A brief survey of the case law follows. 
In Hayre v. Hayre, 65 a non-Sikh mother was denied custody of her Sikh 
child. While framed as a religion issue, the court's reasoning actually turned on 
culture, language and race of the child. McIntyre J. stated: 
This boy is a Sikh. Hewill always be regarded as a Sikh in this country. 
I t  will be well for him to be brought up a Sikh, to preserve his existing 
knowledge of the Punjabi language, to be schooled in the religion and 
traditions of the people with whom he will always be associated. I t  
will, in my view, be possible for him to find a secure personal identity 
only in the Sikh community. It is the only identity our society will 
permit him. Let him, then, be a Sikh and be proud ofthe tradition and 
accomplishments of a proud and worthy race. No matter how much 
she loves him, his mother cannot accomplish this. I direct that custody 
of the boy be given to his father. 
In Camba v. custody of a "very fair" mixed-race childwas awarded 
to an English-speaking African Canadian mother, who encouraged French- 
language speaking in the home. The white French-Canadian father, who was 
less sensitive to the child's multi-linguistic and bi-racial identity, was granted 
access. The court expressly stated that the issue in a race and custody case is not 
the skin colour of the mixed race child. Rather, it is a determination of "which 
parent was most likely to support and encourage the mixed racial and multi- 
cultural background of the child." 
Similarly, a white mother was awarded custody in Ffiench v. Ff~ench,~' 
because she was found to be more likely to promote access to the other parent, 
who was black. By contrast, the father was found to be more likely to 
concentrate only on the child's black heritage. The court said that the best 
interests test included a recognition that children who will likely be perceived 
as Black have an opportunity to develop their self-esteem by continued contact 
with their racial minority background. 
Race was minimized as a factor in determining custody of a bi-racial child 
in Hoskins v. B ~ y d . ~ ~ T h e  British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld a custody 
order in favour of a non-Aboriginal father in Oregon on the grounds that "[tlhe 
force and urgency of the [Aboriginal mother's] opinions based on race are much 
diminished by the child's mixed ~arentage ."~~ 
In Singh v. Singh,'O an expert psychologist testified that "these boys look 
like Sikhs, they will be seen as Sikhs and most importantly they see themselves 
as Sikhs." He testified that without exposure to the Sikh religion from their 
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father, the boys would "grow up with a relatively insecure basis for their 
identity." The judge nevertheless awarded custody to the boy's white mother. 
The court relied on evidence showing that the children were "exceedingly 
unhappy" without their mother, who was their primary parent. Other relevant 
considerations were the fact that the mother claimed to remain an adherent to 
Sikh religion and intended to continue education of her sons in that religion 
and the Punjabi language. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has now provided additional guidance on 
the role of race in custody cases, holding that race is relevant but not 
determinative of child custody decisi~ns.'~ After much publicity and discus- 
sion, the decision is in one sense totally unremarkable. Of course, race is a 
relevant factor. Of course, race is not determinative. The test, as always, is the 
best interests of the child. There are interesting insights in the various 
judgments, however, which speak to the recognition of racism and the 
promotion of substantive equality in law. 
The trial judge had only briefly commented on the issue of race in his 
reasons. He  held it was important for the child to be exposed to his black 
heritage and culture, but stated "there is also the need ofthe child to be exposed 
to the heritage and culture as the son of a Caucasian Canadian."72 
The Court of Appeal, in contrast, treated the child's racial identity as a 
central issue. Harking back to McIntyre J.'s analysis in Hayre v. H a ~ r e , ~ ~  the 
appeal judgment noted that: 
If it is correct that E. will be seen by the world at large as "being black," 
it would obviously be in his interests to live with aparent or family who 
can nurture his identity as a person of colour and who can appreciate 
and understand the day-to-day realities that black people face in 
North American society - including discrimination and racism in 
various forms ... The Supreme Court of Canada has found that there 
is "systemic discrimination against black and aboriginal people" in 
Canada.74 
The Court of Appeal found that it was important for the child to live with 
a family who could nurture his identity as a person of colour. The Court relied 
on the testimony of the father's black spouse, who said that the child's white 
mother "couldn't teach him what it's going to be like to be black, and how he 
is going to be seen in the world as being black .... And reading books won't 
help."75 
The court also considered the social science evidence, which suggests that 
a chiid's sense of self, the chiid's well-being and the future of our society are 
"inextricably related to the colour of his or her skin."76 The court concluded that 
the race factor weighed in favour of assigning physical custody to the father but 
noted that issues o f  culture, race and racial prejudice" are "not determinati~e."~~ 
Newbury J.A. observed that the trial judge "reached no resolution [on the 
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race issue] because ofwhat he regarded as the evenly balanced competing claims 
in this regard."78 She noted that while issues arising from a child's race or 
ethnicity are not specifically adverted to in the Act, they are clearly subsumed 
under the best interests standard, in particular the consideration of a child's 
health and emotional well-being. She added: 'With respect, I am not sure there 
is a 'Caucasian Canadian' culture ...."79 For these reasons, the Court of Appeal 
found that the trial judge erred in not giving proper weight to the issue of race. 
The Supreme Court of Canada granted the mother leave to appeal. The 
mother submitted that there were five problems with the Court of Appeal's 
analysis of race.80 First, there was no evidence before the court regarding the 
child's appearance, and therefore the court ought not to have engaged in an 
analysis of how the child "looked." Second, "given the infinite variety with 
which various racial characteristics may be expressed in human beings, it is 
impossible to contemplate how such an analytical requirement would be 
implemented in any meaningful way at the trial level." Third, mixed-race 
children cannot be pigeon-holed as belonging to either one race or another- 
they belong to both. Fourth, the court's observation that there is no such thing 
as a "Caucasian-Canadian" culture is unsupportable, "not least because there 
was no evidence before the court." Finally, race and ethnicity was not an issue 
that was argued at trial, nor were written submissions provided in the appeal. 
The respondent father argued that, with regard to the issue of race, 
intervention by the Court ofAppeal had been required. He  argued that the trial 
judge applied a stereotypic view ofthe father as a black man, in particular a black 
NBA American athlete. This constituted an error oflaw whichviolated Elijah's 
rights under s.15 ofthe Charterto equal consideration ofhis custodial options.81 
The respondent observed that the purpose of the s.15(1) equality guarantee is 
to protect and promote human dignity: "[Olne of the principal mechanisms by 
which the Charter's quality guarantee achieves that purpose is by barring the use 
of ~tereotypes."~~ 
The respondent argued that the child was entitled to have the parenting 
capacity of all the parties treated equally. Instead: "The trial judge found 
evidence that fit the stereotype, made errors of fact, misapprehended other 
evidence in order to conform to the stereotype, and ignored evidence of Mr. 
Edwards as a person and parent that did not fit the ~tereotype."~~ The 
respondent goes on: 
The historic stereotype of black men offends human dignity. I t  is of 
a lesser being: a feckless father, uncommitted to his family, irrespon- 
sible, full of ungoverned emotions. Black men in particular were to 
know and stay in their place, and not presume entitlement to wealth 
or social status. Fear ofthe sexual prowess ofblackmen and protection 
of white women lays at the heart of racism; fear of mi~cegenation.~~ 
The respondent also argued that Elijah would be identified as a black child 
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and man. The father was better positioned to assist the child in developing 
positive self-esteem, stating that "exposure to the Edwards' Afro-American 
culture can only benefit Elijah, and that culture does not exist in Vancouver." 
The African Canadian Legal Clinic, the Association of Black Social 
Workers and the Jamaican Canadian Association were granted status as an 
intervener to make submissions on the role race should play in decisions 
regarding custody of mixed-race chidren. The intervener argued that from 
both the perspective of family and constitutional law, race is a "majorn factor 
which "must be given explicit consideration and considerable weight in custody 
and access d isp~tes ."~~ TOignore or minimize race as an important factor in 
custody and access disputes "is to discriminate against racialized ~hildren."'~ 
The intervener invited courts to rely on judicial notice of race-related issues. 
Bastarache J., for a unanimous court, found no indication that the trial 
judge was biased against black men generally or against black basketball players 
in particular. He noted that in a custody case, the child will continue to have 
exposure to both parents and therefore have contact with both parents' cultural 
and racial backgrounds. 
Bastarache J. added that, while some notice may be taken of racial facts, 
evidence will usually be important. General public information may not be 
sufficient to inform the trial judge on, for example, race relations in the relevant 
communities or the ability of the parents to address the issue of racial identity. 
In Van de Perre, no evidence had been adduced at trial to indicate that race 
was an important consideration. Instead, the Supreme Court found that the 
issue of race "was given disproportionate emphasis at the initiative of the Court 
of Appeal." The trial judge had considered the issue. His limited findings 
simply reflected the limited weight accorded to the issue by the parties at trial. 
Bastarache J. emphasized that race was just one factor, and "other factors are 
more directly related to primary needs and must be considered in priority." The 
Court held: 
It is important that the custodial parent recognize the child's need of 
cultural identity and foster its development accordingly. I would 
therefore agree that evidence regarding the so-called "cultural di- 
lemma" of biracial chidren ... is relevant and should always be 
accepted. But the significance ofevidence relating to race in any given 
custody case must be carefully considered by the trial judge. Although 
general public information is useful, it appears to be often contradic- 
to ry..., and may not be sufficient to inform the judge about the current 
status ofrace relations in a particular community or the ability ofeither 
applicant to deal with these issuesg7 
In summary, the Supreme Court in Van de Perre held that the importance 
of race as a factor varies from case to case. Expert evidence is likely required as 
to the race relations in various communities, the importance of race as a 
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consideration in the circumstances, and the ability of the parents to meet the 
child's need to develop skills to deal with racism and to have pride in her 
heritage and identity. 
By its emphasis on the need for individual consideration of race and the 
need for evidence in each case, the Court may be creating barriers to a 
meaningful discussion of race in custody and access cases. It is unquestionably 
true that race should not determinative; custody cases absolutely require 
individual determination. The concern is that the Court placed less emphasis 
on another unquestionable truth: racism is endemic to Canadian society and 
children of mixed race parents are "racialized" individuals who need skills to 
cope with discrimination. As an aspect of its individualized approach to 
questions of race, the Court problematically suggests that race may be a 
relatively minor factor that does not always matter. 
An individualized approach must not obscure the necessary identification 
of the realities of racism. Race is not a relatively minor issue in our society. It 
does matter. It should not be necessary to adduce evidence in every case to prove 
this basic premise. The analysis of systems of oppression like sexism and racism 
depends on an examination of the full social and political context to discern 
generalized patterns of power and privilege. Focusing exclusively on individu- 
als, refusing to look at the common experience, may obfuscate systemic 
problems. 
If it is necessary to adduce evidence with respect to race in each case, the 
cost and time barriers to developing the record may be prohibitive to a proper 
exploration ofthe issue. It is interesting to contrast the reflections ofL'Heurew- 
Dube J. in Moge. In that case, the Court accepted that courts must take judicial 
notice of the economic impact of divorce on women. The Court recognized 
that litigants would likely not be able to afford the cost of expert evidence of the 
economic consequences of marriage breakdo~n.8~ L'Heureux-Dube J. wrote: 
Based upon the studies which I have cited earlier in these reasons, the 
general economic impact of divorce on women is a phenomenon the 
existence of which cannot reasonably be questioned and should be 
amenable to judicial notice. ...U] udicial notice should be taken of such 
studies, subject to other expert evidence which may bear on them, as 
background information at the very least. 
In all events, whether judicial notice of the circumstances generally 
encountered by spouses at the dissolution of a marriage is to be a formal part 
of the trial process or whether such circumstances merely provide the necessary 
background information, it is important that judges be aware of the social 
reality in which support decisions are experienced when engaging in the 
examination of the objectives of the Act.89 
In Van de Pewe, Bastarache J. notes that courts have taken judicial notice 
of racism,90 but less emphasis is placed on the judge's need to recognize this 
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social reality. Instead, the Court focuses on the requirement to examine 
individual cases to assess whether race is an issue. This may imply that racism 
is not an issue in some circumstances-the idea being that racism is alarge scale 
problem obviated in individual contexts by well-intentioned equality-minded 
white people. 
Regardless of our positive and progressive intentions, the reality is that all 
of us, whether we experience oppression or privilege in relation to an aspect of 
our identity, have been thoroughly schooled by discourses of discrimination. 
Conclusion 
Family law is vitally important to the individual families it serves. It  is also 
very much a dialogue about power in contemporary social relations. The 
discourses offamily law work to define, prescribe and control our most intimate 
lives, in subtle and dramatic ways. And family law reflects and reinforces, 
sometimes challenges, dominant discourse in our pressing social struggles 
around discrimination. 
A substantive approach to equality rejects the formalistic notion that "likes 
should be treated alike," and so requires the rejection of simplistic demands for 
a one-size-fits-all presumption of "equal parenting" post-separation. Yes, 
there may be two parents, but that tells us almost nothing about actual 
relationships with the children. 
Substantive equality requires us to look at individual circumstances, with 
an eye to the larger social and political context ofthe claim. It  therefore reminds 
us that our lives and thinking are necessarily marked by systemic sexism/ 
racism/ classism/ ableism/ heterosexisrd transphobia. It should not be neces- 
sary to introduce expert evidence ofthe importance ofrace to a mixed race child. 
Our ideal of substantive equality challenges us to abandon a "common 
sense" shaped by majoritarian ideals. W e  are instead required to give voice to 
those traditionally silenced and valorize the political identities associated with 
discrimination. So, while our trans client was repeatedly told by early settle- 
ment conference judges it was "obvious" she would fail, she achieved justice 
after a full trial. She had a chance to speak and be heard. 
All mothers, all fathers, all children, all families, deserve to be treatedwith 
dignity and respect in family law. Substantive equality principles developed 
under the Charter help us achieve this ideal. 
Withgratitude to Martha McCarthy for hergracious expert assistance. Thanks also 
to my spouse, Maretta Miranda, and our newborn son, Cameron A v e y  Miranda- 
Radbord, for showing me all that is good and beautIf.1. 
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